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The ‘Silent Dilemma’ of Transitional Justice: Silencing and Coming to Terms with 
the Past in Serbia 
 Jelena Obradović-Wochnik 
Introduction 
Following the July 2008 arrest of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, indicted for the siege of Sarajevo and crimes 
against Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), author Slavenka Drakulić wrote that ‘Serbs live in denial.’2 This is a resonant 
representation of ‘the Serbs’ in practitioner and scholarly transitional justice literature, in which this group is 
constructed as not just in denial of the past but also indifferent to crimes committed by Serbs against Croats, 
Bosniaks and Albanians in the 1991–1999 conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The general public, variously labelled 
and conflated with ‘Serbia’ or ‘the Serbs,’ is seen by transitional justice actors as one obstacle to confronting the 
past. Whilst the focus of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been prosecuting 
war criminals, many domestic, civil society initiatives have attempted to change societal attitudes towards the past 
by organizing publicity campaigns about crimes committed by Serbs aimed at ‘broad acknowledgement’3 of these 
crimes. However, as practitioners have noted, the public is generally silent and disengaged from these debates. 
Marijana Toma, a prominent activist from the Humanitarian Law Centre, recently suggested that the majority of the 
Serbian public does not know or want to know about the past, which it denies directly or interpretatively.4 The 
silence of the public has also been conceptualized as the ‘banality of indifference’ and ‘hate silence.’5 
Such representations have emerged partly as a result of constructs based on a ‘negative’ reading of silence,6 
whereby the absence of ‘the public’s’ voice and participation is understood predominantly as a result of denial of the 
past. More broadly, this reading can be situated within what Jessica Greenberg identifies as a dichotomic reading of 
nonparticipation in postsocialist countries, where ‘failures’ are correlated with ‘absences,’ such as ‘reconciliation, or 
its absence, [and] political participation, or its absence.’7 Moreover, such readings are diffused through 
nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs) discourse on the past, whereby transitional justice advocates who often 
have relatively little empirical engagement with the public continue to speak on its behalf. 
The absence of ‘ordinary’ voices in transitional justice debates in Serbia and the disconnect between the public and 
practitioners are evident at some transitional justice events. For instance, in May 2011, I attended a discussion in 
Belgrade organized by NGOs campaigning for a regional truth commission. Although the talks were clearly aimed at a 
general audience, the audience was composed primarily of activists from Belgrade and Sarajevo, the media and 
intellectuals. The only audience members not already affiliated with regional activist circles were a handful of 
students. It was thus a discussion at which experts spoke to other experts about issues on which they broadly agree. 
When I visited one of my respondents later that day, I was struck by the disconnect between the activists’ reality and 
that of their intended audience. The respondent, a middle-aged, university-educated public sector employee, would 
not have been able to attend the discussion as she would have had to leave work early and take two buses, in 
addition to having to look after her elderly mother and two children. The respondent was also very careful that her 
private life be enacted primarily within the confines of her immediate neighbourhood. This was a result of difficult 
experiences in the 1990s, including being physically attacked during anti-Milošević demonstrations, as well as 
subsequent problems with mental health. During my research in Belgrade, the respondent and I discussed the wars 
and the violent past. Her feelings about the crimes committed against others were those of revulsion. She expressed 
acknowledgement of these crimes many times.8 Yet, her story and opinions are absent from debates conducted 
publicly. This disconnect, I argue, is primarily due to transitional justice initiatives in Serbia prioritizing and 
normalizing public engagement, discussion and acknowledgement as the most visible ‘evidence’ of the society’s 
‘coming to terms with the past,’ to the point of silencing those who do not conform to this approach,9 implicitly 
framing them as ‘failures.’10 This approach rarely considers socioeconomic, cultural and personal limitations to such 
engagement, and that speaking out is not always possible, or desirable.11 
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This article posits that the public is not as silent as it might seem; rather, some narratives are not audible to 
practitioners of transitional justice. I explore this disconnect through the dynamic of silencing,12 suggesting that 
transitional justice practice can create discourses that disengage audiences and discourage them from speaking. I 
argue that selective academic engagement – which prioritizes activists’ voices whilst neglecting empirical research 
on audiences ‘below’ – creates further silence through exclusion, as well as lack of reflection on relationships of 
power and privilege that may lead to such practices. Further, transitional justice practitioners, concerned with public 
participation, often fail to consider the contexts that make such participation and speaking (im)possible.13 
Whilst the article focuses on Serbia, I aim for broader relevance, arguing that transitional justice has a complex 
relationship with silence. Specifically, I ask if transitional justice practice and discourse create ‘silent’ subjects. The 
logic of publicity that drives some mechanisms, such as truth commissions and trials, can be overprioritized, as in 
Serbia’s case, to the point at which silent, nonverbal or performed confrontations with the past are overlooked, 
misunderstood and thus silenced further.14 Fighting against silence is such a deeply entrenched approach of 
transitional justice that critical reflections on ‘silence’ are rare.15 
This article follows Gurminder Bhambra and Robbie Shilliam’s assertion that ‘“silence” is an “increasingly pertinent” 
concept through which to frame and investigate … contested projects.’16 This conceptual framework is concerned, in 
part, with exposing silences and analysing what might constitute silencing.17 I use it to explore how transitional 
justice practice and discourse create inclusions and exclusions,18 and whether they can disenfranchise, rather than 
empower, audiences to speak about violent pasts. 
To examine the intersections of transitional justice and silence, the article uses Serbia as a case study. Given its 
wartime violence, a nationalist and repressive regime until 2000 and subsequent governments’ failure to instigate a 
systematic approach to transitional justice, Serbia is enveloped in several layers of silence and silencing. Regimes 
have worked to repress public knowledge of atrocities and the past, whilst NGOs have worked to fight against 
silence. The case illustrates that there are no straightforward relationships between silence and its breakage, and 
that individuals do not always respond by keeping silent when faced with repression. It also illustrates that silence 
can be circumscribed by unequal power relationships and practices of exclusion.19 
These exclusionary practices are exemplified, in Serbia’s case, by the repressive Milošević regime, whose drive to 
suppress the truth about war crimes resulted in what Lynn Thiesmeyer labels a direct form of silencing.20 Using 
propaganda and physical violence, the regime threatened the lives of journalists and activists who sought to expose 
the truth about the wars. After Milošević, the public sphere did not transform into an arena that encouraged debate, 
and even today debate about the past is largely ignored. This, too, silences the public. 
In this article, however, I focus more on the ways in which domestic practitioners of transitional justice enact 
practices that silence the public. That successive Serbian governments would hope to keep their public silent and 
thus avoid culpability in the wars is unsurprising. I explore the rather more well-meaning practices that may 
inadvertently create discursive conditions that discourage public discussion. NGOs are well positioned for this 
examination as, in Serbia, they are often the only domestic actors engaged directly with projects that target the 
public. Various Serbian governments can make no such claims, and their relationships to transitional justice are 
tenuous at best. Moreover, scholarship on Serbia appears relatively uncritical in relation to NGOs, whose positions 
mostly go ‘uncontested.’21 NGO activists come across as speakers for the public, and much scholarship engages 
exclusively with them. ‘The society’ thus emerges as a subject constructed through this academic–practitioner 
dialogue. 
The insights in this article are drawn from a larger, ethnographic study on narratives about the 1991–1999 wars and 
war crimes offered by ‘ordinary’ individuals who are not explicitly involved in politics or civil society activism and 
who can be said to form the target audience for most transitional justice initiatives in Serbia. The study, carried out 
between 2005 and 2007, consisted of 36 recorded semistructured interviews (as well as unrecorded interviews, 
conversations and ethnographic observations) with individuals of Serb ethnicity living in Belgrade. Their ages ranged 
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from 18 to 82. None of the respondents took part in the wars, but many had family members or friends who 
participated as conscripts or as volunteers, some of whom were killed. I collected their narratives about the wars 
and observed the performances that accompanied them, such as silences, crying, gestures and the spaces within 
which the narratives were told. In this case, I understood narrative as ‘a story, and stories tell about things that have 
happened or are happening to people.’22 The study is relatively small in terms of sample size,23 but I did not aim for 
generalizable trends, rather seeking to explore the range of ways in which the respondents understood and made 
sense of the violence and war crimes. 
This article first examines the relationship between transitional justice and silence. It then discusses different 
approaches to silence and silencing before presenting a case study of transitional justice practice in postconflict 
Serbia. It elaborates how most domestic civil society projects interpret transitional justice as a truth-recovery 
process and base their work on ‘confronting the past’ as an act of silence-breaking directed at the general public. 
Then, the article considers how the public nature of these initiatives is in direct tension with the ways in which 
knowledge about war crimes and human rights abuses normally circulates amongst Serbian individuals and 
communities. It describes how the practice of transitional justice, which focuses on public testimony, creates a 
dilemma for actors unable or unwilling to speak, or be heard,24 under these discursive conditions. 
Transitional Justice, Truth and Silence 
Transitional justice is similar to human rights activism in its drive to reveal ‘secrets of hidden violence’ and inspire 
observers to action.25 It relies on ‘the assumption that witnessing results in understanding and requires response.’26 
The field likewise seeks responses to violent or criminal pasts, often via truth-telling initiatives.27 It fights against the 
absence of elicited responses,28 but it also tries to ensure that when silence is broken, victims, observers and even 
perpetrators have a voice with which to speak, through mechanisms such as truth commissions.29 As suggested by 
Ari Gandsman, much of this is premised on the idea of the silent victim whose ‘healing’ can be reached through 
testimony.30 By combating silence, transitional justice aims to produce narratives about the past. 
This fits with broader trends in peacebuilding to which transitional justice is closely linked. For instance, Gearoid 
Millar argues that ‘centrality of truth’ is located in the peacebuilding literature, where it is one of ‘the dominant 
paradigms of postwar trauma and healing,’31 and that in ‘the West … truth and knowledge are seen as inherently 
good and healing.’32 Reflecting on Sierra Leone, Rosalind Shaw points out that the truth-telling paradigm within 
which truth commissions operate has emerged as ‘natural’ and ‘universal.’33 According to Simon Robins, truth is 
often understood to mean reconciliation.34 
This discursive, ‘confessional’ approach35 to postconflict peace and justice can in part be attributed to the growth of 
what Vanessa Pupavac refers to as ‘therapeutic governance,’ in which postconflict experiences are ‘psychologised’ 
based on an Anglo-American interpretation of ‘emotional disfunction.’36 Traumatization, Pupavac argues, and a need 
for healing are often observed by international actors and donors,37 with assistance from local civil society and 
grassroots organizations. Transitional justice draws on this psychological tradition in which silence is framed as the 
‘failure of speech’ and ‘a dysfunctional absence’ redeemed ‘through the restoration of voice.’38 
Much of these arguments relates to transitional justice in its original, narrow, legalistic conception, which is often a 
top-down process carried out through institutions such as war crimes courts or tribunals with little regard for local 
dynamics. Whilst transitional justice, in practice and the literature, has broadened out from these original views to 
incorporate a wide variety of community initiatives, mechanisms and local initiatives,39 it still carries a strong focus 
on silence-breaking activities. Moreover, the critique of this approach expressed by scholars working in non-
European contexts has not been applied to Serbia, where transitional justice continues to be driven by silence 
breaking.40 
In seeking public deliberation on the past, transitional justice actors prioritize immediately audible responses 
(testimonies, narrative responses) without taking into account that responses to past violence are not always 
spoken.41 Whilst relying on narrative and discourse, transitional justice initiatives rarely consider the working 
4 
mechanisms of speech and problems faced by individuals when speaking about violence.42 Importantly, much 
transitional justice practice is unreflexive about the kinds of discursive conditions its formal and informal initiatives 
create.43 
Approaches to Silence 
Silence is frequently conceptualized as an absence of speech,44 and thus often understood in negative terms,45 
especially when it occurs under repressive regimes.46 For instance, both Eviatar Zerubavel and Stanley Cohen equate 
silence with ignorance and denial, and even conspiracy, where ‘a group of people tacitly agree to outwardly ignore 
something of which they are all personally aware.’47 
I follow a more critical and exploratory approach to silence, where silences are understood as integral parts of 
speech.48 Whilst silences, individual or collective, can indicate a forgetting of an incident or an event,49 this is not the 
only interpretation. As Carol Kidron points out, silences, particularly those surrounding difficult or violent pasts, can 
be sites of communication.50 Indeed, silence can be understood as ‘the ultimate example of acknowledgement and 
remembrance.’51 
In her study of Holocaust survivor families, Kidron suggests that the past can be remembered silently and 
remembrance embodied in everyday objects and practices.52 Furthermore, memory and acknowledgement of 
violence can also be performed. Pilar Riaño-Alcalá and Erin Baines suggest that memory is not only composed of 
‘evidentiary documents’ but also contained in ‘performative elements of testimony’ that include silences and pauses. 
Thus, ‘the archive’ can be ‘inscribed on the bodies of tellers and listeners.’53 As Kidron points out, however, this view 
of silence as a ‘medium of … transmission of knowledge’ is neglected in the focus on ‘logocentric’ aspects of 
silence.54 But, as a number of scholars suggest, the problematization of silence tends to be a Eurocentric concern,55 
as there are practices that do not conform to the ‘western, confessional model of healing.’56 These elements are 
rarely captured by the transitional justice mechanisms deployed in Serbia. 
Importantly, some silences are the result of silencing,57 which may be due to institutional biases, oversights or 
exclusions, both accidental and intentional,58 or to self-imposed censorship or a lack of attention.59 As Thiesmeyer 
writes, the creation of particular narratives can be shaped by individuals and institutions with (in)formal means of 
power that determine which voices can or should be excluded.60 For instance, Kirk Simpson explores how Northern 
Ireland unionists feel that the stories of their victims have ‘remained untold, silenced by their political opponents.’61 
Silences are complex sites of intersecting tensions. Individuals and communities may be trapped in what Lene 
Hansen calls ‘silent dilemmas,’ where they may feel the need to remain silent as speaking may endanger them.62 
Silences may appear to be a ‘choice,’ Hansen argues, but they are more likely to be imposed by structures, practices, 
traditions and discourses,63 as well as poverty and social exclusion.64 Reliance on speech to convey problems is a 
notion that presupposes that speaking is possible65 and ‘desirable.’66 
To explore dynamics of silence in Serbia, I draw on Thiesmeyer’s ‘theory of silencing,’ based on Foucault’s regulatory 
discourse, which ‘constructs and edits … knowledge.’67 Thiesmeyer’s theory of silencing is concerned with ‘disguised’ 
forms of silencing in addition to more overt forms such as those resulting from totalitarian repression.68 Importantly, 
she notes that ‘enlightened forms of silencing’ that ‘supply other language in the place of the silenced material’ offer 
a ‘simulacrum of freedom of expression or of choice among discursive alternatives.’69 They also produce ‘those who 
cannot speak’70 and assumptions that ‘since they are not being heard from, they are therefore not trying to say 
anything.’71 
I follow Thiesmeyer’s investigations into how identification ‘of groups and discourses about (not by) [certain 
individuals and communities] arise, and how such discourses are used to construct these entities as silencable.’72 
This is similar to the perception of ‘the Serbian public’ as described by transitional justice initiatives. 
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Transitional Justice in Serbia 
Successive Serbian governments have been unsympathetic to transitional justice and cooperated reluctantly with 
the ICTY. Lack of government involvement has stifled debates about the past and allowed for the public sphere to be 
monopolized by a large number of revisionist pundits, religious leaders and far-right groups that periodically engage 
in war crimes denial. 
Since the early 1990s, civil society actors have attempted to initiate anti-war and anti-nationalist campaigns,73 with 
some, such as the Humanitarian Law Centre, focusing on transitional justice. Domestic transitional justice discourse 
and practice have been dominated by NGOs as the most visible civil society actors, including Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Belgrade, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Youth Initiative for Human Rights and Women in 
Black. As Jasna Dragović-Soso notes, their approach to the past has been fragmented,74 but much of their work 
revolves around silence-breaking activities, including publishing, public speaking, campaigning or commemorating 
massacres and visiting genocide sites. Many campaigns are aimed at the Serbian public. This has led to the 
development of the discourse on ‘confronting the past,’75 which includes ‘broad acknowledgement’ that Serbs and 
their leaders committed atrocities in the 1990s.76 Recently, a coalition of activists has commenced a campaign for a 
truth commission in the region,77 arguing that public advocacy is crucial to establishing truth about the past.78 
In Serbia, a significant ‘academic-practitioner synergy’ has emerged in transitional justice work, which is a common 
trend in the field.79 For instance, scholars work with domestic NGOs in collaborative projects or ask NGOs’ opinions 
about Serbian society’s engagement with transitional justice.80 This is echoed by Zinaida Miller in the suggestion that 
that ‘there is a tendency of scholars or ex-commissioners to become consultants to, rather than fully external critics 
of, the [transitional justice] enterprise.’81 Thus, experts speak to other experts (activists) about ‘the public’ and 
activists’ voices become amplified whilst obscuring voices of ‘the public,’ the subject of that discourse. This is 
problematic as the Serbian public tends to hold negative views of NGOs and criticizes their lack of engagement with 
the domestic audience.82 
Within transitional justice in general and Serbia in particular NGOs are not often understood as ‘actors that exercise 
power.’83 This results in often uncontested representations of the ‘silent public’ they construct. The priority given to 
‘alternative voices,’84 NGOs and experts, and the lack of visibility of the public in narratives about itself, has resulted 
in the silencing of a vast range of experience and knowledge about the violent past that individuals embody, 
circulate and believe.85 
The ‘Silent Public’ 
Several overlapping layers of silence and silencing exist in Serbia. The Milošević regime silenced the public, 
opposition, media and activists in a very direct and repressive way.86 Post-Milošević governments, meanwhile, have 
been complicit in an insidious form of silencing by not creating conditions under which speaking about the past is 
welcomed.87 
Silencing in Serbia also occurs through omission and neglect.88 Although it appears that transitional justice practice 
does anything but ignore the public (given its focus on engaging the public in debates), the public in many campaigns 
and statements exists primarily as a subject ‘constituted’89 through the academic–practitioner dialogue. The public is 
at once visible and invisible, constantly referred to or implied in criticisms of Serbia’s failure to confront the past and 
yet with virtually no voice of its own.90 When the public ‘speaks,’ it does so through surveys (which flatten the 
diversity of experience and allow the public to speak only through pre-prepared statements) and practitioners, and is 
not in control of its own narrative. Instead, ‘the public’ is assigned a subjectivity, ‘the felt interior experience of [a] 
person that includes his or her positions in a field of relational power.’91 This silences the public further, as surveys 
do not give individuals the opportunity to voice their own stories in their own terms. Wartime realities for most 
respondents were much more complex than, for instance, surveys would be able to capture. 
One particularly alienating, and thus silencing, practice is the misunderstanding of how stories of violence and war 
crimes are remembered and narrated. They are not always immediately visible but are embedded deep within social 
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interactions, exchanges and silent acknowledgement.92 Many of these stories and their telling are governed by 
implicit social rules. For instance, in social gatherings, such stories may be hinted at but their telling is quickly 
thwarted. Discussions of violence are particularly avoided around children. I witnessed, for instance, occasions 
where teenagers asked their parents to explain a television news item we had just watched featuring a war criminal 
or the story of a massacre and the parents refused to do so. This dynamic occurred in all discussions of death and 
violence (such as suicide), not war crimes and political violence alone. Despite this, wartime stories do circulate, and 
it is often grown-up children who are their ‘keepers.’ This group, in its twenties, tells stories of close relatives who 
fought in the wars, cousins killed in the conflicts, friends who committed suicide after returning from Kosovo or 
neighbours who volunteered for paramilitary units and ‘never came back’ – stories their parents avoid. But, 
knowledge about the violent past circulates, and the stories’ often ambiguous details embody knowledge of 
atrocities. The possibility that a family member may have been implicated in war crimes was never explicitly denied 
during my research. 
These elusive stories are situated in an everyday world, closely guarded against intrusive and violent topics. 
Reluctance to talk about violence was evident when my respondents discussed a Youth Initiative for Human Rights 
campaign commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide.93 The campaign included posters and 
billboards urging the public ‘To See, To Know, To Remember.’ One image appeared to be a child’s decomposing 
hand. A respondent recalled his confusion regarding the campaign; he was at a loss as to what the initiative ‘wanted 
us to do.’ He did not talk about his impressions to anyone, and mentioning them to me was, he admitted, the first 
time he had talked about this at all.94 
Such campaigns do not resonate with individuals whose engagement with war crimes is one not of public discussion 
but of silent knowing.95 There are situations in which, as both Hansen and Claire Wilkinson point out, it is not always 
possible or desirable to speak or protest.96 Acknowledgements of crimes committed against others can be 
performed without being explicitly verbalized.97 One respondent, for instance, began crying as she recalled news 
coverage of the start of the war in Croatia.98 A male respondent had an archive of press clippings that detailed 
several Serb-committed atrocities.99 A younger respondent, a teenager at the start of the wars, attempted to come 
to terms with them by reading as much as possible and ‘trying to imagine’ what it must have been like to live under 
the siege of Sarajevo. He travelled to Bosnia and spoke to people there about the war.100 A female respondent spoke 
frequently of a Bosniak friend who survived the Sarajevo siege. She mentioned the friend’s coping mechanisms and 
acknowledged implicitly what she must have suffered (referring to the friend’s experience as ‘horrifying’ and 
‘tragic’), yet never spoke directly of it.101 These silent, personal reflections demonstrate some kind of engagement 
with past violence, yet one not articulated so that it is readily ‘heard’ and understood by transitional justice 
practitioners. Practitioners seek public engagement and explicit apologies, not recognizing the fragmented way 
individuals cope with and talk about violence or establishing mechanisms for their inclusion. 
The Unknowledgeable Public 
Another practice that silences the public is the disconnect between what NGO campaigns claim the public knows and 
does not know about the past and what individuals know but do not communicate. The Serbian public is frequently 
constructed as needing to be (re)educated. For instance, the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights ran a project on 
‘Crimes and Punishment in the Minds of People: The Internalization of the ICTY Legacy.’102 The project ‘focuses on 
improvement of knowledge’ and ‘tackling a number of stereotypes and misconceptions among general public’ 
regarding the ICTY and war crimes. In 2010, the centre ran the ‘News from the Past: Historical Illusions, 
Misconceptions about the Past and Their Social and Political Effects’ project, which targeted ‘citizens’ and whose aim 
was ‘not to study the attitudes of the public … and wonder about their origin and seek explanation for their 
existence.’ Explicit about its aims at reeducation, the centre wished to influence and change  
"the attitudes of those who are able to command the attention of the majority of citizens and can act 
convincingly to persuade them to think differently and to revise some of their deeply held perceptions of 
historical events.103" 
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In general, it is made clear that one of the things that has to change is ‘the Serbs’’ perception of their own 
community as victims.104 However, such projects assume that ‘the public’ is misinformed and uncritically subscribes 
to the ‘Serbs as victims’ view. This view constructs the public as a subject that has to admit publicly its ignorance and 
engage with transitional justice initiatives on those terms. This contributes to the ‘silent dilemma,’105 as individuals 
may be reluctant to engage on this basis, preferring to keep silent in order not to be labeled ‘ignorant.’ 
Participating in transitional justice initiatives means that one must speak within set boundaries. Often these 
boundaries oscillate around the underlying notion of ‘confronting the past,’ the debate that centres on ‘the Serbs’’ 
acknowledgement of atrocities committed against ‘ethnic others.’ Generally, however, narratives about the past 
contain this and more. Most individuals in Serbia have some connection to the wars in the former Yugoslavia, as 
many lost friends or relatives in the wars or had sons drafted to fight, some of whom were subsequently killed. 
Among the respondents, such stories were embedded in and part of narratives that acknowledged brutal crimes 
committed by Serb forces. These experiences were not divorced from the regret they expressed about the loss of 
ethnic others’ lives or the horror they felt at knowing that Serbs committed war crimes. A resonant interpretation of 
transitional justice by the respondents in this study was that these stories are rarely heard because the conditions 
set for speaking publicly are usually centred on the singular issue of admitting that ‘Serbs’ committed war crimes. 
Interviews with respondents on issues relating to war crimes revealed not that they were, as Simpson puts it, 
‘against truth recovery in some form,’ but rather that they felt ‘their stories lack an audience.’106 For instance, one of 
my respondents, a male student in his twenties and a supporter of transitional justice, could not reconcile his 
experience of the wars with what he perceived to be a discussion focused on Serbian guilt. He spoke of how different 
his experience of the 1990s, in a small Serbian town, was compared to how this is often represented. Here, he 
presents stories of personal tragedies and resistance to the wars:  
"There were … 48 men in [the town], all reservists, who threw their weapons down once they were called up 
and refused to go to war … because they had people coming back [from the war] before them and bringing 
home bombs, guns, ammunition … One of my friends went to the army when he was 18, and he was in [the 
war in] Kosovo. When he returned, he committed suicide. There were a lot of bad things like that.107"  
Similar sentiments were expressed by other respondents, who felt not only disenfranchised from the decision-
making mechanisms that took Serbia to war but also unable to do anything about the conflicts. An older male 
respondent noted, 
 "I remember that no one asked me if we should go to war or not … I keep repeating that, because no one 
asked me … I couldn’t comprehend that there would be someone crazy enough who would take the country 
to war.108" 
The collected narratives, as illustrated briefly above, hide numerous stories of resistance, particularly opposition to 
the wars and Milošević. Whereas some scholars argue that Serbian citizens can be deemed ‘responsible for atrocities 
of their state because they provided a permissive social and political environment for the atrocities to occur and did 
not do enough to prevent them,’109 the reality is far more complex. Acts of resistance against the regime were not 
always visible, nor was it always possible to make them public. Respondents engaged in ‘everyday resistance’110 and 
subtle forms of opposition, with many thus refusing to engage or believe in Milošević propaganda. Less ‘everyday’ 
but likewise ‘invisible’ resistance came in the form of acts directed at opposing the regime’s nationalist policies. For 
instance, one female respondent helped hide her son’s friend who was evading the draft for the war in Kosovo.111 
Several respondents also had children or close relatives who emigrated from Serbia in the 1990s partly in response 
to Milošević-era politics. As Wilkinson highlights, migration as protest is just one of the ‘silent’ forms of opposition 
employed by those who are unable to ‘speak.’112 These ‘protests’ against war and nationalist politics were enacted 
within the space of the home, the only sphere respondents felt they could control, and which many guard against 
unwelcome intrusions such as depictions of violence and death. 
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Respondents also circumvented the Milošević regime’s silencing and repression of atrocities by learning about the 
scale of the fighting from refugees, conscripts and volunteer fighters. These stories often diverged from the 
propaganda that Serbs were engaging in ‘self-defence.’ According to a young respondent whose father, a Bosnian 
Serb, made frequent trips to Bosnia during the war,  
"I would say it was pretty horrific … In those parts where he is from, for example, Serbs were selling bullets 
to the Muslims … He said, ‘We’ve sold out’ … He can’t stand this Ratko Mladić who bombarded Sarajevo 
from a hill. He told me all kinds of things that happened there … He said what Serbs did to the Muslims and 
what Muslims did to the Serbs … What affected me was when he told me that these people that we knew, 
that they were slaughtered.113" 
The respondents thus actively resisted the silencing of the Milošević era by circulating stories and ‘storing’ 
knowledge about atrocities through social interactions or ‘silent acknowledgement.’114 Rather than participating in a 
tacit agreement to keep silent and deny crimes (Zerubavel’s ‘conspiracy of silence’),115 many respondents indicated 
that they did not talk about these events because they were, in the words of one respondent, ‘too horrible.’ Hence, 
silence was enacted not because respondents did not know about the crimes or denied them but because they knew 
and found it difficult to speak about them.116 A female respondent who learned about some atrocities committed by 
Serbs in Sarajevo from Bosnian Serb refugees in her neighbourhood said,  
"There was so much insanity there, I don’t know if insanity is the right word. I don’t know, really. You can’t 
even say they are bestial crimes, because even beasts wouldn’t do the kinds of things they did to each other, 
everyone. That’s something that stays with you, and within all that you don’t see a speck of reason, a speck 
of humanity. No. There is nothing human there, it wasn’t, it was killing, but also torture, torturing someone 
until he really dies … I just don’t have the words.117" 
This extract is one of many examples of respondents admitting to struggling to make sense of the wars and violence, 
whilst also struggling to find the words with which to articulate their meaning.118 As Elaine Scarry explains, 
euphemisms and metaphors are used in discussions of violence that frequently result in omissions.119 Violence, 
according to Michael Taussig, has the effect of destroying language.120 Furthermore, as Valentine Daniel points out, 
individuals show a marked inability to express violent events in ‘known’ terms, which suggests the ‘unshareability’ of 
pain.121 In transitional justice, however, there is frequently an expectation that victims, perpetrators and witnesses 
will communicate verbally about events that are frequently labelled ‘unspeakable.’122 The inability to speak about 
violence – through lack of appropriate vocabulary or capability to conceptualize and verbalize violent events – 
creates yet another layer of silence. 
The Collective Experience and the Ethnic Subject 
Another act of silencing occurs through the implicit collectivization of the wartime experience and confronting the 
past. For instance, the public is frequently, interchangeably or inconsistently referred to as ‘the Serbs’ or ‘Serbia.’ 
This results in ‘slippages of meaning,’ which, as Lila Abu-Lughod points out, create ‘hyphenated entities’ and obscure 
complex relationships.123 This is one of the reasons why the public is invisible in transitional justice debates: the 
Serbs-Serbia-Serbian society or ‘the public’ exists primarily as an imagined audience, constructed through expert 
narrative. Further, this narrative implicitly collectivizes, homogenizes and flattens the society and its experience of 
the past, disregarding complex realities, such as the acts of resistance described above. As Johanna Mannergren 
Selimović finds in a recent study on Bosnia, local- and individual-level narratives of wartime violence often contest 
various collective interpretations.124 
Moreover, ‘the public’ is explicitly constructed as an ethnic subject (‘the Serbs’), without regard as to whether this 
assignation of identity has any resonance.125 As Cilian McGrattan argues, this approach silences nonethnic 
experiences of conflict,126 and the past. Much of the debate on how Serbia should come to terms with the past has 
revolved around the question of whether transitional justice initiatives should be ‘de-ethnicised.’127 Specifically, the 
debate at one point focused on whether all victims of past wars should be acknowledged and included in transitional 
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justice initiatives in Serbia. A leading activist, Sonja Biserko, however, has pointed out that this should not be the 
case as Serbs/Serbia committed the most crimes.128 Indeed, as Stef Jansen argues, people died because of ethnic 
labels,129 so this category should not be dismissed so easily. However, not all ‘Serbs’ supported ethnonationalist 
politics or understood war (or themselves) as ‘ethnic’ subjects, and hence many find it difficult to engage in debates 
about the past in ethnic terms. Among my respondents, victims of the wars were often identified and mourned as 
‘poor people’ or ‘ordinary people,’ as suggested by the two extracts below from a male and a female respondent, 
both in their 60s:  
"People against people, one people destroying another. Serbs destroying Muslims, Muslims destroying 
Serbs. A civil war. If it wasn’t for those four [leaders] there would have never been a war. I would have never 
gone to fight against a Muslim, why would I when I worked with them … like we were brothers? No one 
asked you what you are … We were not bothered.130"  
"I feel so sad about it. I read what happened in Slavonia [a Croatian region caught up in the 1991–1995 war], 
what kinds of brutalities they carried out … That is horrible! And all the destruction of houses. A house – gas, 
they close the windows and shoot a bullet with flames or maybe something else but the house burns down 
and everything in the house. Horror! … But what makes me the saddest is human victims. You can’t make up 
for someone’s life … I’m really sad it all happened, that a brother could turn on his brother. Everyone used to 
live together, Serbs in Bosnia with Muslims and Croats, and suddenly, they took their guns out and started 
shooting each other. And those mass graves, and those murders, they really unsettled me.131" 
These respondents offer a rejection of ethnic, Serb-centric positioning and are far from replicating or assenting to 
Milošević-era ideology. Instead, the rejection of ethnic subjectivity is related to the nonethnic identifications that 
respondents often emphasized. For instance, older respondents spoke of their past compatriots across the former 
Yugoslavia in familial rather than ethnic terms. They rarely said ‘Croats’ or ‘Muslims,’ instead saying ‘brothers,’ 
‘family’ and ‘neighbours.’ Curiously, perpetrators of atrocities were likewise rarely identified ethnically. Whilst 
respondents broadly accepted that individuals from their community and country committed war crimes, they often 
sought to identify perpetrators as caricatured, extreme and marginal examples from each community. 
Many transitional justice campaigns in Serbia focus on exposing Serb crimes against ethnic others and obtaining Serb 
acknowledgement and apology. Whilst this should certainly be a part of transitional justice projects, as McGrattan 
suggests, the focus on ethnicity oversimplifies and disregards the complex identities and experiences of violence.132 
Respondents in this study demonstrated that they understand the wars in terms much broader than those used by 
transitional justice practitioners. Further, ethnicity as ‘the public’s’ primary mode of interpreting the conflicts is often 
simply assumed. As McGrattan points out, in certain cases, ethnic framing within transitional justice is partly due to a 
preference in elite politicians’ and academic narratives that disregards ‘marginal experiences of conflict based on 
gender, class and locale.’133 That this ‘disregard’ occurs in some postconflict contexts sits sharply against a growing 
literature and critical reflections on ‘marginal,’ nonethnic or gendered experiences of violence and war.134 But, 
where transitional justice mechanisms end up ignoring these dimensions, McGrattan argues, ‘the burden of 
reconciliation is imposed on the vast majority of individuals who rejected violence’135 – individuals who did not 
support conflict or identify with the ‘ethnic’ or collective experience, and who remain alienated from transitional 
justice initiatives. 
The ‘Silent Dilemma’ 
The final question, thus, is whether sections of ‘the public’ in Serbia do know about the past, acknowledge the 
crimes committed, feel apologetic, reject nationalist ideologies and did not agree with wartime politics. If they do, 
why are they never ‘heard’? This is the result of two dynamics: first, what and how they communicate about the past 
is carefully mediated136 – to the point where silence is also ‘reactive … to the intervention of experts’137 – and, 
second, the social and cultural capital, opportunity and enthusiasm for being involved with transitional justice 
initiatives are lacking. 
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NGOs, currently the key actors behind attempts to ‘break the silence’ of the public, set up their campaigns in a way 
that it makes it difficult for the public to be heard. The initiatives are either one-directional (as with the above-
mentioned reeducation project) or require material or physical engagement, such as presence at talks and panels. 
NGOs usually push for public visibility while individuals cope with knowledge and acknowledgement privately, and 
often silently, in order to ‘control’ their knowledge and feelings.138 NGOs also often misunderstand or overlook the 
material, financial and social location of their audience. As I illustrated at the beginning of this article, individuals 
require free time as well as cultural and social capital in order to take part in NGO initiatives. As Denisa Kostovicova 
points out, low levels of social capital and trust have led to generally low participation in civil society across 
postsocialist Eastern Europe.139 The respondents I interviewed complained that NGOs operate in ways that are 
unfamiliar to them and in contexts in which they would feel alienated. For instance, one respondent believed that if 
he attended a talk organized by NGOs, he would not know what to say and would feel ‘patronized.’140 A young 
respondent complained that as NGO workers earn more than most ‘ordinary people,’ she would feel uncomfortable 
at gatherings of well-dressed, confident activists.141 This might sound trivial, but it demonstrates that alienation from 
public sphere discussions can occur in many forms that are not accounted for when the ‘silent public’ is criticized for 
its lack of empathy and participation. 
In Serbia, the pursuit of public narratives and engagement with the past has resulted in silenced voices, in individuals 
who find it impossible or difficult to make themselves visible and audible and so to be seen and heard to be 
participating in transitional justice initiatives. They are ‘voices twice silenced,’142 first, by the conditions of 
engagement set forth by transitional justice initiatives and, second, by their own perception that their stories are 
unwanted. Individual actors are then stuck between two equally undesirable options: engage with transitional 
justice initiatives (i.e., speak publicly about the past) or remain silent. 
Overall, ‘the public’ – at least the respondents presented here – is caught up in a ‘silent dilemma.’143 It is unable to 
speak and fearful that attempts at speaking will result in unwelcome attention, such as being further constructed as 
a problematic audience. Silence is thus used as Hastings Donnan and Simpson suggest, strategically, in order to 
manage feelings.144 The prioritization of public engagement and silence breaking has created a dominant discourse 
on the past and established what kinds of positions must be held towards it. This discourse implies not only that 
speakers cannot deny the past but also that they should not remain silent and that they should engage in public acts 
of acknowledgement and apology on very particular, usually ethnic ‘Serb’ terms. This is a Foucauldian regulatory 
discourse that sets the parameters for what can and cannot be said. As silencing, it ‘designates the dominant 
potential for retaliation against the autonomous political agency of rebel speech.’145 
‘Rebel speech’146 includes everything that falls outside the parameters of transitional justice discourse: explicit 
apology, public discussion, a broken silence. According to Thiesmeyer, language can be used as a silencing tool as 
certain forms of language can be given priority and legitimacy over others.147 Thus, ‘the public’ whose engagement is 
called upon to battle silence about the past is included in civil society debates only if it is heard saying the right thing. 
Conclusions 
Transitional justice scholarship is continually widening, but not enough attention is paid to its relationships with 
silence, language, narrative and communication of violence. If transitional justice is to capture a range of 
complexities engendered by postconflict societies and individuals, bringing in theories of silencing and reflecting on 
the use of language could help expose issues that are not immediately obvious or visible. Some of these issues 
include the ways in which audiences, instead of being participants in transitional justice debates, can become 
‘trapped’ observers or ‘silent subjects.’ Transitional justice practice is rarely reflexive about the kinds of discursive 
conditions and opportunities for participation it creates. It frequently assumes that speaking and taking part ought 
to take place without much difficulty. However, that large numbers of people do not take part can be understood by 
considering the ‘silent dilemmas’148 created within transitional justice practice and asking who cannot speak, and 
why. 
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Specifically, as the example of Serbia shows, asking those questions in order to understand silence can be obscured 
by the normative push towards reconciliation. Furthermore, the same logic disables transitional justice actors from 
asking questions about their complicity in creating silences. By decoupling ‘silence’ from ‘denial’ and engaging in 
deeper empirical research with target audiences, transitional justice practice and scholarship can start to expose 
some of the mechanisms that exclude, rather than include, participants and to uncover the complexities inherent 
within silences. 
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